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In this paper we will compare the Zen view of the person with three 
central aspects of the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Jung. The 
Western psychoanalytic understanding of the person has been chosen 
as a basis for comparison with Zen Buddhism for four reasons. First, 
unlike the Christian view, for example, that of psychoanalysis is a product 
of the twentieth century and it therefore reflects a distinctively modern 
Western approach to the issue. Secondly, unlike many other contem­
porary perspectives such as that of the personalists or existentialists, 
psychoanalysis has developed an extensive system of therapeutic techniques 
based on its understanding of the nature of the person. The affinity 
between technique and theory is also central to Zen Buddhism and the 
dyadic relationships of analyst/analysand and of Zen Master/disciple, 
for example, provide ready points of comparison. Thirdly, although there 
have been previous comparisons between Zen and Western psycho­
analysis,’ these projects have often been quite general in scope and few 
detailed comparisons on specific points have been attempted. It is hoped 
that the three specific comparisons outlined here will shed further light 
on the distinctive way in which the person is understood within the Zen 
Buddhist framework. Lastly, in the case of Jung, we have a Western 
psychoanalyst who, in fact, was quite cognizant of many basic Zen
1 See, for example, Fromm, Suzuki and DeMartino, Z«i Buddhism and Psychoanalysis 
(New York; Harper and Row, i960). On p. 78 of that volume, Fromm notea wmc 
previous writings in the area.
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Buddhist ideas1 2 and a comparison between Zen and Jung, therefore, 
assumes a particular appropriateness.
1 See, for example, Jung’s Foreword to D. T. Suzuki** Introduction to Zen Buddhism 
(New York: Grove Press, 1964).
s In deference to an audience of psychoanalysts, D. T. Suzuki once lectured on the 
nature of the “unconscious” in Zen Buddhism, but his usage of the term is patently not
Freudian. Not only does Suzuki call this unconscious “ante-scientific” and “ Cosmic,” 
but it is also clearly a state of awareness rather than unawareness. See Fromm, ZB and
Psychoanalysis, pp. 10-24.
4 The translation of shiryo (JEB), Jushuyo (^FJEB) and hishiryo (#JEB) as “thinking,” 
“not-thinking” and “non-thinking*’ follows the rendering of Waddell and Abe in their 
translation of Ddgen’s Fukanzazmgi (The Eastern Buddhist, VI: a, October 1973, p. 183). 
In some contexts, it might be helpful to translate the third term, hishifyo, as “without 
thinking.” An English discussion of Ddgen’s distinction can be found in Hee-Jin Kim's 
excellent book, Dogen Kigtn: Mystical Realist (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975), 
pp. 76-78. The only serious criticism I have of Kim’s account is that he tends to in­
troduce too many metaphysical and mystical nuances by translating the second term, 
fus/uryo, as “the unthinkable.” An excellent, dialectically oriented discussion of the three 
terms can be found in Akiyama Hanji’s Japanese work, Dogen no ksnkyu [d Study of Dfyen\ 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1935; republished by Reimei shobd in 1965), pp. 258-66.
i Zen and Freud's Mechanisms of Defense
It is not difficult to note obvious ways in which Freud’s psychoanalytic 
theories are not in accord with the basic viewpoint of Zen Buddhism. 
Most important of all, the primary distinction in psychoanalysis—the 
split between the conscious and unconscious mind—has no correlate in 
Zen.3 At those rare points when Zen Buddhists do make distinctions 
concerning the nature of mind, it is usually more along the lines of the 
“thinking/not-thinking/non-thinking” characterization used by Dogen, 
a characterization that he in fact inherited from Yueh-shan.4 The dis­
tinctions among these three modes of consciousness constitute a complex 
issue in Ddgen’s thought, but even a brief se{ of definitions will reveal 
the contrast with psychoanalytic categories. “Thinking” is basically any 
category-affirming attitude within consciousness while “not-thinking” 
is the negation of that attitude. That is to say, “not-thinking” is the name 
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for the outright rejection of all conceptualization. “Non-thinking”, on 
the other hand, takes neither an affirming nor a negating attitude for its 
intentionality. Since it does not objectify ideas, there is no object for it to 
either affirm or deny. For Ddgen, this pre-reflcctivc or pre-conceptual 
state of mind is more fundamental than the other two and it is the proper 
attitude to assume in seated meditation. Although we will make some 
further references to DSgen’s triadic distinction later in this paper, for 
now we only wish to point out that in the Zen Buddhist distinction we 
find no equivalent to the Freudian or Jungian conception of the uncon­
scious. A similar point could be made about Zen Buddhism’s attitude 
toward the remainder of Freud’s system, e.g., his analyses of ego, id, and 
superego. These notions would not be so much rejected as neglected by 
Zen. Considered to be reflective, reconstructive conceptualizations of 
experience, these ideas would have no place within Zen’s practical 
emphasis on pre-reflective experience. Furthermore, even in terms of 
therapeutic theory, the situation of the monastery and that of the analyst’s 
office are so strikingly different that there would seem to be little ground 
for fruitfill comparison. In particular, Zen’s path of personal development 
goes beyond returning neurotic and psychotic patients to functional 
normality. Indeed, it is meant to be the basis of a whole way of living 
quite separate from that of “normal” people.
Despite the ease with which we can list such evident incompatibilities 
between Zen and Freud’s psychoanalysis, if we look below the surface, 
we can see certain significant affinities. We can, of course, find several 
general themes held in common by the two such as the belief that personal 
freedom is essentially based on overcoming dominance by the passions, 
or the conviction that “liberation” follows from self-knowledge rather 
than from devotion to something transcendent.5 In this brief discussion, 
however, I have in mind a much more specific point of comparison, viz., 
their common realization that conceptualization or rationality may 
actually function as a hindrance to man’s liberation from his unconscious 
5 For * consideration of some of the humanistic ideals shared by Freud and Zen, see 
Fromm’s essay, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in Fronun, ZB and Prxhoanaijsu, 
pp. 77-141.
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compulsions. In Freud, this realization is expressed in his concern for 
removing the negative effects of particular “mechanisms of defense” in 
the ego; in Zen, it is visible in the Master’s insistence that the disciple 
overcome his dependence on concepts.
In order to understand the importance of Freud’s conception of 
mechanisms of defense, a few remarks about his overall project will 
give this theory a framework. In his later writings, Freud recognizes 
three interrelated agencies that must be given due consideration: the 
id, the superego, and the ego. In most general terms, the id is the reposi­
tory of the instinctual, libidinal drives. As such, the id forms the founda­
tion of the pleasure principle, the tendency toward direct, immediate 
self-gratification. On the other hand, there is an opposing reality principle 
that checks this first tendency. Not only is direct gratification often im­
possible because of physical conditions, but also, it is often forbidden by 
various rules imposed by culture and society. These rules of acceptable 
behavior are considered to be embodied in the dicutes of the superego, 
one of its major enterprises being the development of conscience. Because 
of the potential conflict between the pleasure and reality principles, there 
is the need for a third, negotiating agency that can mediate the demands 
of these other two. This third agency is, of course, the ego. Besides being 
the center of differentiating consciousness (thought), it also establishes 
(conscious and unconscious) structural mechanisms through which the 
individual adapts his behavior to the external world. To function ade­
quately, the conscious part of the ego obviously must have access to the 
material from the id and superego in an undistorled farm. Unfortunately, 
this is not always the case. For example, material that has been repressed 
(painful memories of specific traumatic events, libidinal desires that the 
superego considers sinful or improper, etc.) can often make itself available 
to consciousness only in an altered fashion. Undoing this distortion is a 
primary aim of Freud’s therapeutic analysis: the more the patient under­
stands the nature of his conflicting needs and the more he understands 
how the distorted manifestations of repressed psychic data have affected 
his behavior, the more freely the ego can develop adequate courses of 
action. In other words, Freud’s basic project is to bring repressed, un­
conscious material to the level of consciousness.
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Let us consider now the role of mechanisms of defense within this gen­
eral framework.
For the ego has to try from the very outset to fulfil its task of 
mediating between its id and the external world in the service of 
the pleasure principle, and to protect the id from the dangers of 
the external world. If, in the course of these efforts, the ego learns 
to adopt a defensive attitude towards its own id as well and to 
treat the latter’s instinctual demands as external dangers, this 
happens, at any rate in part, because it understands that a 
satisfaction of instinct would lead to conflicts with the external 
world. Thereafter, under the influence of education, the ego 
grows accustomed to removing the scene of the fight from outside 
to within and to mastering the internal danger before it has be­
come an external one; and probably it is most often right in doing 
so. During this fight on two fronts—later there will be a third 
front as well [with the superego]—the ego makes use of various 
procedures for fulfilling the task, which, to put it in general terms, 
is to avoid danger, anxiety and unpleasure. We call these pro­
cedures ‘mechanisms of defense.’6 7
• Sigmund Freud, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable'* (1937) in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psjchologieal Works of Sigmund Frond, ed. and tram. James Strachey 
(London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1958), xxin: 335. 
Henceforth, Standard Edition is abbreviated SE with volume and page numbers.
7 Ibid., p. 238.
In other words, Freud discovered that the ego consciously and uncon­
sciously utilizes various procedures for preventing direct confrontation 
with psychic material that might prove threatening or disturbing. 
Threatening to what? To the maintenance of the status quo of the ego itself.1 
Through the organizing structures of the ego, a state of equilibrium is 
achieved, a state that allows some of the instinctual drives of the id to 
be expressed (either directly or indirectly) within the limitations posed 
by the prohibitions of the superego and the demands of external reality. 
Through the utilization of the mechanisms of defense, the ego fends off 
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psychic contents that pose a threat to this equilibrium. Some of these 
mechanisms include repression, regression, projection, sublimation and 
“undoing.”8 Although Freud felt that some of this defensive apparatus 
is probably necessary in order to keep at bay the overwhelming urges 
of the id, the mechanisms of defense can nonetheless become “fixated” 
in such a way that they may do more harm than good.9 In such instances, 
they become automatic, stylized responses to certain types of situations, 
responses that might have been appropriate at an earlier stage of psychic 
development, but which are no longer suitable. In effect, such fixated 
defenses become blinders that limit the person’s perception of the actual 
situation and they may “bring about ever more extensive alienation 
from the external world.”10 11Because these mechanisms are utilized both 
by and for the ego, Freud notes that the analyst’s effort in therapy is 
“constantly swinging backwards and forward like a pendulum between 
a piece of id-analysis and a piece of ego-analysis.”11
8 For a comprehensive examination of the varieties of defense mechanisms, see Anna 
Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, trans. Cecil Baines (New York: International 
Universities Press, 1946).
9 “It sometimes turns out that the ego has paid loo high a price for the services they 
[the mechanisms of defense] render it. The dynamic expenditure necessary for maintain­
ing them, and the restrictions of the ego which they almost invariably entail, prove a 
heavy burden on the psychical economy. . . . They become regular modes of reaction 
in his character, which are repeated throughout his life whenever a situation occurs 
that is similar to the original one.’* Freud, “Terminable,** SEt xxm: 237.
19 Ibid., p. 238.
11 Ibid.
The implications of this Freudian discovery are relevant to our parti­
cular discussion of Zen in two ways. First, we can see that even for Freud, 
the ego is by no means infallible or fully objective in its structuring 
processes and, in fact, the ego is always designing compromising con­
structions that reflect only as much of “reality” as can be handled at 
any given time. Yet, this is the ideal functioning of the ego and, in most 
cases, it blocks out even more of reality than is appropriate. For this 
very reason, the analyst must set out to disassemble many of the ego’s 
mechanisms of defense. As in Zen, mere thinking or mental structuring 
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is itself no guarantee of objectivity. In fact, dependence on defense 
mechanisms is an example of being so determined by past conditioning 
that one is unable to respond freely in the present—precisely one of the 
situations Zen endeavors to avoid. Zen disagrees with Freud only as to 
the exiensiveruss of defensive mechanisms in that it considers all intellectual• 
constructions to be defense mechanisms insofar as they become patterns 
of response whose appropriateness is not evaluated in each new situation. 
In other words, any conceptual framework, even Freud’s id/superego/ 
ego, can become the basis for automatic, stylized modes of response and 
Zen consequently regards them all with suspicion.
Another comparative point about Freud’s view of the ego’s mecha­
nisms of defense is that it endeavors to explain why they develop whereas 
Zen is indefinite on precisely this point: it attacks complete dependence 
on thinking/not-thinking, but it gives no detailed etiology of the de­
pendence. Extending the Freudian thesis (beyond Freud’s own intent), 
we may ask if Zen would also assert that rationalistic thinking is essen­
tially a defense mechanism that arises out of the need to exclude un­
pleasant aspects of reality. The answer is that it would, but the nature ol 
what is excluded is different from Freud’s conception (as we might expect, 
insofar as Freud is primarily concerned only with the psychoanalytic 
dimensions relevant to psychotherapy). Within the traditional Zen 
viewpoint, the repressed object is neither the id’s forbidden impulses nor 
painfully traumatic memories, but rather, the exfitrierue of imptrmantnee. 
As a withdrawal from this perception of change, conceptual frameworks 
reify experience into substantial entities that may undergo change, but 
remain self-identical. The epitome of this process, according to Zen, is 
the objectification of the self. Freud, too, recognizes that the ego becomes 
an object for itself, though for him, this is an inevitable and often very 
positive development in the personality. For Zen, though, this is a flight 
from the reality of pre-reflective experience into the stasis of intellectually 
restructured memories.
In summary, we have seen that both Freud and Zen endeavor to 
prevent the person’s behavior from being strictly determined by defensive 
reactions inherited from past experience; both seek an opening up of the 
person’s options so that he can realize his capacity to understand and 
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act freely within present situations. Beyond this basic similarity, however, 
we have also noted a distinctive divergence between the two systems. 
Specifically, although both Freud and Zen maintain that conceptualiza­
tions may become restrictions on human freedom, Freud maintains that 
dependence on at least some mechanisms of defense is inevitable. Because 
of its emphasis on pre-reflective experience, Zen maintains that all such 
dependence must be overcome. In other words, Freud seeks to replace 
inadequate, fixated ego structures with ones that better correspond to the 
patient’s present situation, but Zen seeks to open the present to the 
disciple by helping him to become independent of all such structures. 
As we shall now sec, this same distinction also underlies the difference 
between the analyst/analysand relationship in Freud and that of the 
Master/student in Zen.
ii Freud and Zen on “ Transference”
The interaction between Zen Master and disciple is an integral part 
of Zen training and we will here investigate this association further by 
comparing it to a contemporary Western one, namely, that between the 
Freudian analyst and his patient. In both cases the dyadic nature of the 
relationship is essential: although one may have more than one teacher 
or even more than one confessor at a time, a client has only one analyst, 
a disciple only one Zen Master. One consequence of the gradual dis­
appearance of apprenticeship in our modern Western society is that the 
dyadic relationship of learning has become quite rare. The psychoanalytic 
situation is a significant exception to this general rule and it serves as an 
illuminating point of comparison with the interpersonal dynamics be­
tween Zen Master and disciple. We will begin our discussion with an 
explication of Freud’s conception of transference.
Whatever his original ideal of the analyst’s objective distance might 
have been, Freud came to realize early in his career that “any analysis 
without transference is an impossibility.”12 Although the term “trans­
ference” has become a general one referring to the entire relationship 13
13 Freud, An Autobiographical Study (1925), in SE, xx: 42.
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between analyst and patient, in Freud’s own usage it is more specific.13 
At first, transference was considered to be a type of “displacement,” 
i.e., the process of raising to consciousness the affect from a repressed 
(unconscious) memory by means of changing the affect’s original ob­
ject?*  For example, having repressed the memory of a traumatic incident 
concerning his father, a patient can release some of the suppressed 
emotion by “transferring” it onto someone else with whom he has direct 
contact. In this manner the emotion has an outlet even though the re­
pressed memory itself has not become conscious. What Freud gradually 
discovered is that the new object of the transferred affect is most often the 
analyst himself. In this more specialized sense then, “transference” 
indicates that the patient, without apparent justification, projects various 
emotions onto the analyst and the analyst inevitably finds himself in­
volved in the patient’s emotional life?5 Depending on the circumstances, 
the analyst may be the object (by transference) of either the patient’s 
love or his hostility (or both).
13 For an excellent summary of Freud’s use of the term “transference” throughout his 
career, see J. Laplanche and J. B. Pon tai is, The Language of PsycJuxxnaljsis, trans. Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), pp. 455“^4-
14 Freud, Interpretation qf Dreamt (1900), in SE, v: 562-63.
13 Of course, the interrelationship between patient and analyst is also functional in 
the opposite direction as well. Although Freud himself only touched on this topic, later 
analysts have taken up the study of “countertransference.” That is to say, repressed mate­
rial may also arise from the analyst’t unconscious and he may become irrationally at­
tached or hostile to a particular patient. For a comprehensive treatment, see Heinrich 
Racker’s Transference and Counter-transference (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psycho-Analysis, rg68).
Although the appearance of a “transference-neurosis” may seem to 
present an inescapable obstacle to the further progress of analysis, Freud 
discovered that it could also present the opportunity for the patient to 
have a significant insight into his own unconscious. By raising the re­
pressed affect to consciousness, even though it may be in a seriously 
transferred or displaced form, the very act of repression becomes manifest 
to the patient. Through the analyst’s careful guidance, the analysand 
may be brought to the point of recognizing that there is no rational 134*
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justification for his emotional projections and this insight may itself 
constitute a crucial turning point in the patient’s self-understanding. The 
implication is that the transference-neurosis may itself become a concrete 
phenomenon by which both the analyst and the analysand can gain entry 
into the material within the latter’s unconscious. Freud summarizes the 
centrality of transference very clearly in the following passage:
Thus our therapeutic work falls into two phases. In the first, all 
the libido is forced from the symptoms into the transference and 
concentrated there; in the second, the struggle is waged around 
this new object and the libido is liberated from it. The change 
which is decisive for a favorable outcome is the elimination of re­
pression in the renewed conflict, so that the libido cannot with­
draw once more from the ego by flight into the unconscious. This 
is made possible by the alteration of the doctor’s suggestion. By 
means of the work of interpretation, which transforms what is 
unconscious into what is conscious, the ego is enlarged at the cost 
of this unconscious.16
16 Freud, “Analytic Therapy,” in Introductory Lecturts on Psycho-Analysis in.SE, xvt: 455.
The centrality of this phenomenon within the psychoanalytic setting 
leads us to wonder if a similar occurrence takes place in the relationship 
between Zen Master and disciple.
Certainly, something at least resembling transference does occur in 
this relationship and in fact, in certain respects, the transference is even 
more intense within the Zen framework than it is in the psychoanalytic 
situation. For instance, the Zen disciple regards the Master as an example 
of that which he wishes to become. This identification is stronger than 
that achieved in psychoanalysis in at least two ways. First, the analysand 
does not typically consider his training to be completed only if he him­
self becomes an analyst, but the Zen monk ultimately seeks the Master’s 
certification that allows him to become a Master himself. Secondly, 
both the Zen Master and the student believe that the Master has achieved 
something (“realization” or “enlightenment”) that the student also 
desires to achieve. This underscores the basis of the Master’s authority.
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The analyst, on the other hand, is primarily distinguishable from the 
analysand in that he has command of a special methodology for uncover­
ing repressed material and mitigating its effects.17 Although the patient 
may feel he lacks the ability to cope with certain situations, that ability 
is not solely possessed by psychoanalysts; in fact, it is precisely something 
that all “normal” people are expected to have. In other words, the 
analyst is a person who has special knowledge of certain techniques, but the 
Zen Master is himself considered to be a special person, one who has 
achieved a special state of spiritual insight and self-realization. Again, 
this difference would seem to imply that the transference-neurosis is 
probably more likely to arise in Zen than in psychoanalysis.
17 “Analysts are people who have learned to practice a particular art; alongside of 
this, they may be allowed to be human beings like everyone else.” Freud, “Terminable,” 
SE, xxm: 247.
Even in the actual interaction between Master and disciple the possi­
bility of transference is clearly present For example, in the sanzen 
interview, the disciple makes an effort to respond in the same mode 
(non-thinking) as the Master. To the extent he tries to imitate the Master, 
it is easy for the student to fall into filial affection and dependence. On 
the other hand, since the Master’s demands on the student can often 
be the cause of great frustration, hostility may also arise. To experience 
the Great Doubt is by no means a pleasant experience and the student 
may hold his Master responsible for his suffering. In this regard, the Zen 
Master may encounter “resistance” on the part of the student in much 
the same way as an analyst might encounter it within the analysand. 
Even though the cause of the resistance is somewhat different in the two 
cases (in the former, it is a resistance to giving up dependence on con­
ceptualization ; in the latter a resistance to unearthing repressed memories 
and desires), to the extent the process of self-understanding is painful, 
it is natural that the person undergoing that process will sometimes 
doubt its ultimate value.
Despite these similarities with the psychoanalytic phenomena of trans­
ference and resistance, the Zen situation is also very different in some 
fundamental ways. First, and most importantly, the Zen student’s reac­
tions to the Master are justifiable within the terms of their actual inter­
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relationship. No affect need be transferred from a previously repressed 
traumatic experience: the Master indeed behaves in a manner deserving 
of both affection and hostility. That the Master is sometimes a kindly, 
caring, supportive figure and at other times a stern, unfeeling task master 
is not a mere matter of projection, but is quite objectively the case.1* 
Secondly, although it is very likely that sonu genuine Freudian trans*  
ference will arise, Zen differs from psychoanalysis in its treatment of this 
phenomenon. In particular, the Zen Master does not try to convince the 
student that his feelings are ungrounded, i.c., he does not use the trans­
ference phenomenon as an entry into the analysis of repressed, traumatic 
memories. In comparison with Freud, Zen is markedly unconcerned with 
the student’s past; abreaction” has no formal place within the monas­
tery. The student is constantly challenged to be a full participant in the 
present, rather than to return to the past in order to free the present. 
Thirdly, within the Zen situation, there is ideally no possibility of counter­
transference. While it is assumed that the psychoanalyst can never be 
completely free of the affects of his repressed unconscious, the Zen 
Master is judged to be no longer determined by the past. Not bound to 
any particular set of conceptualizations, the Master is free of unconscious 
compulsions. Because of the far more active role taken by the Zen Master 
in comparison with the analyst, the purity of his own self-understanding 
is proportionally more significant. In accord with the enormous influence 
that a Master exerts over his students, the credentials to be a Master are 
cautiously guarded and only given to selected students after many years 
of careful supervision. Even though the training of an analyst also requires 
several years of specialization, the final authorization is not as com­
l* The same ambivalence is formalized in the roles of the five officers of the monastery. 
For example, thejihijitsu is the stem disciplinarian and the shoji is the supportive guardian 
of the monks* welfare. Importantly, the five officers periodically rotate their roles so 
that the stem jihijitsu, for example, may suddenly become the kindly shoji. For further 
details about the roles of the officers, see Joshu Sasaki, Buddha is 0u CmUr of Gravity (San 
Cristobal, New Mexico: The Lama Foundation, 1974), pp. 64-65.
abi eaction—the psychic re-enactment of a previously repressed traumatic experi­
ence so as to relieve the psychic tension accrued from the original incident and the 
repression of its memory.
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prehensive as that of a Zen Master: for a Rinzai Master to confer his 
authorization upon a student, he must testify to the fact that the student’s 
realization is as deep as his oum, a declaration that he is not likely to take 
lightly.
Therefore, although we might wish to speak of a transference relation­
ship within Zen training, the nature of this transference and the way in 
which it is treated are quite distinct from those of the psychoanalytic 
situation. To further elaborate on this difference, we can now briefly 
consider one aspect of technique shared by Zen Masters and psycho­
analysts, viz., the emphasis on spontaneity. By examining how this common 
emphasis has a distinctively different rationale in the two systems, we will 
better see in what way Freudian psychotherapy and Zen training are 
fundamentally divergent in their goals.
Much of the development of psychoanalytic technique has been 
concerned with ways of gaining access to unconscious material by circum­
venting the censoring processes of the ego. The theory is that if the 
patient is required to respond spontaneously, the mechanisms of defense 
will be caught off guard and important data from the unconscious will 
become available (even though it may still appear in somewhat dis­
torted form). Some of the better known techniques developed by psycho­
analysts include Freud’s free association and dream interpretation, Jung’s 
word association test and active imagination, and Rorschach’s inkblot 
test. As an example of one of Freud’s earliest techniques, we can consider 
the following practice described in Studies in Hysteria:
I inform the patient that, a moment later, I shall apply pressure 
to his forehead, and I assure him that, all the time the pressure 
lasts, he will see before him a recollection in the form of a picture 
or will have it in his thoughts in the form of an idea occurring to 
him, and I pledge him to communicate this picture or idea to 
me, whatever it may be.20
at> Freud, Studies in Hysteria (1895), in SE, n: 270.
Here we see Freud calling upon the patient to react without thinking about 
the significance of what is happening. This is strikingly like the Zen Master’s
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provoking his student into making an immediate, unpremeditated re­
sponse to a koan, a gesture or a challenge. As we have seen, in such cases 
the Zen Master will not accept even a moment’s hesitation. Freud, too, 
realized that hesitancy is a sign of conscious (or “preconscious”) restruc­
turing of the experience.
The longer the pause between my hand pressure and the patient’s 
beginning to speak, the more suspicious I become and the more 
it is to be feared that the patient is re-arranging what has occurred 
to him and is mutilating it in his reproduction of it.21
11 Ibid., p. 279.
22 For Freud’s emphasis on the importance of putting the affect into words, see 
Studies in Hysteria, SE, n: 255.
8l
Despite the similarities, however, the Freudian emphasis on sponta­
neity has a distinctively different emphasis from that of Zen. In particular, 
Freud is looking for a link with a repressed memory of a traumatic ex­
perience. Therefore, the psychoanalyst is primarily concerned with 
following up the response with a series of questions that will enable the 
analysand to recall the original experience and to express the affect 
verbally.22 On the other hand, the Zen Master seeks to encourage 
spontaneity on the part of the student because he wishes the student to 
show that he is of past conditioning and no longer dependent
on concepts or words. Hence, the spontaneous reaction of the analysand 
fits into a larger pattern of determinism; the spontaneous response of the 
Zen disciple reveals the freedom from being determined by such a 
pattern. From the other side of the relationship, the Zen student accepts 
the Master’s action and responds to it directly, but the psychoanalytic 
patient ultimately responds not to the pressure of the hand but to some­
thing else entirely, viz., the repressed memory and its accompanying 
affect. Therefore, although both the Zen Master and the analyst try to 
provoke spontaneous responses in their subjects, the nature of the spon­
taneity and the direction of the response are distinctively different in the 
two situations.
To sum up these points about the comparison between Freudian
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analysis and Zen, we can say that while many aspects of the general 
structure have much in common, there is nonetheless a basic difference 
in perspective. Freudian analysis is primarily aimed at revealing aspects 
of the unconscious to the conscious; Zen is concerned with the different 
modes of consciousness, viz., thinking, not-thinking, and non-thinking. 
Equally significant is the fact that Freudian analysis is primarily directed 
to the patient’s past experience since therein lie the roots of the patient’s 
problems in the present, but when Zen endeavors to break down the 
disciple’s dependence on previous conditioning, it does so by concentrat­
ing its attention on the directly experienced present. Stated differently, Freud 
frees the patient’s present by disassembling unfortunate patterns of condi­
tioning acquired in the past and he guides the patient so that he can re­
experience and verbalize the past traumatic incident as-it-ow. In contrast, 
Zen maintains that pre-refiective non-thinking is a form of experience 
that has not yet been restructured either by conscious or unconscious 
forces and if the Zen disciple manages to ground himself in that mode of 
relating, there is no need to be concerned with the specific nature of past 
experiences in that he already has a grasp on present experience as-it-ir. 
Both Freud’s psychoanalysis and Zen endeavor to relieve people of their 
being compelled by unknowingly contrived and unspontaneous modes 
of behavior, but the processes by which they seek to achieve results and the 
rationales behind those processes are radically different.
A further contrast is that the relationship between analyst and analy­
sand is primarily one between doctor and patient, but in Zen, the tie 
between Master and disciple is much stronger than this. In psychoanalysis, 
the patient goes to the analyst because he has special knowledge which 
will help him cure the patient’s disease and return him to “normalcy”; 
in Zen, the disciple ultimately wants to become like the Master himself— 
he wants to be more than “normal” and indeed, to a certain extent, 
desires to be extraordinary. To concentrate our attention on this goal of 
going beyond mere normalcy, we will turn now to another major figure 
in psychoanalysis, C. G. Jung. In particular, we will investigate his model 
of “individuation” to sec if it can shed further light on the Zen ideal of 
the person.
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hi Zen and Jung's Individuation
As we have seen, although Freud and Zen share several points in their 
interpretations of the person, Zen also differs radically from Freud in that 
(i) it denies the ultimate value of replacing unsatisfactory mechanisms of 
defense with new ego structures and (2) it rejects Freud’s basic project of 
freeing the present by resolving the repressed problems of the past. For 
those familiar with other traditions of psychoanalysis, the question might 
arise of whether Jung’s system would offer a more fruitful comparison 
especially insofar as he emphasizes (1) the cooperation of the conscious 
and the unconscious (with no tension between ego and id) and (2) a 
prospective rather than retrospective therapy. In this brief section we will 
focus our comments by considering in particular Jung’s theory of individ­
uation or self-realization as it compares with the developmental image of 
the person in Zen.
In order to frame the remarks to follow, we will first consider Jung’s 
general outlook, particularly insofar as it deviates from the tradition 
established by Freud. Freud primarily saw himself as formulating a new 
science which would harken a new era for mankind—an era in which 
what he called the “dictator of reason’’ would push back the forces of the 
unconscious and reclaim fresh territory for the forces of the ego. In accord 
with this sense of giving mankind a fresh start, Freud postdated his 
Interpretation of Dreams from 1899 to 1900 so that this work would usher in 
the new century. As we saw in the two previous sections of this chapter, 
Freud tends toward a mechanistic view of the psyche and his therapeutic 
process is primarily one of repair: he seeks to release the repressed ca­
thexes that misdirect psychic energies and trap them within the un­
conscious. To remove the impediments to the ego’s control of the individual, 
the person must return to the memory of the original trauma and release 
its cathexis through abreaction or catharsis.
Jung, on the other hand, does not see himself as a technologist assisting 
the imperial forces of the ego, but rather, as a rediscoverer, an archeo­
logist of the psyche who digs into man’s unconscious, unearthing the 
psychical roots that link the individual with the rest of humanity, even 
with those in cultures and times other than our own. Consequently, 
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rather than opposing one aspect of the psyche to another, Jung sets his 
goal as the integrating of the various forces into a whole, a process he 
labels “individuation.” In line with this difference in emphasis from 
Freud, Jung’s image of the psychological functions is organic rather than 
mechanical: unlike a machine, the psyche has no purpose that we can 
empirically determine and, like other organisms, the psyche possesses the 
potential to cure itself through its inherent compensating forces of self­
adjustment. Therefore, rather than trying to repair a machine by removing 
obstructions in its energy flow, Jung merely seeks to act in harmony with 
the psyche’s own process of healing. Rather than correcting the malfunc­
tions inherited from the past, Jung tries to let the present develop of its 
own accord toward the equilibrium and integration of the self—the 
process he calls “individuation.”
What is this process and how does it arise of its own accord? Although 
clearly a central idea in Jung’s system, individuation lacks a single 
classic definition. While Freud strives for the definitional clarity of a 
science, Jung implies that clearcut definitions deprive psychoanalytic 
concepts of their web-like interconnections and disguise the underlying 
ambiguity characteristic of living processes. Unfortunately, this often 
leads to disorganization and obscurity, and in our considerations here we 
will outline a description of individuation that is more implicit than ex­
plicit in Jung’s own writings. It is only one of several possible accounts 
that we might present, but for our comparative purposes, it is particularly 
useful. We shall attempt to develop our interpretation with the help of 
two basic features in Jung’s thought: his theory of types and his concep­
tion of the transcendent function.
As is well known, Jung developed a comprehensive system for determin­
ing and classifying each individual’s “psychological type.”23 Indeed, 
his classification of the two “attitude types” of extravert and introvert has 
found its way into our everyday language. Our concern here, however, is 
primarily with the other types, the “function types” of thinking, feeling, 
sensation, and intuition. Jung’s theory is that just as each individual has a 
M See Car) G. Jung, Psychological Types (1921), in The Collected Works of Carl G. Jtmg, 
trim. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), vi.
84
ZEN, FREUD, AND JUNG
natural propensity to be either an extravert or an introvert (depending 
on whether he primarily directs his psychical energy outward or inward), 
individuals also develop a typical pattern of apprehension that is operative 
in primarily one of two ways: either through sensation or through intui­
tion. Furthermore, Jung discovered that each individual also typically 
favors one of two ways of structuring experience: either by thinking or by 
feeling. We should bear in mind that these categories are only to be con­
sidered as general tendencies within a given individual. Also, although 
Jung himself describes the types and their combinations in great detail, 
for the purposes of our present project, such a venture into the intricate 
distinctions and interrelations is unnecessary; our goal here is merely 
to have a general understanding of the rationale behind the typologies.
Given these basic typologies, we can theoretically locate a person’s 
psychological type on a three-dimensional graph with the parameters 
being extraversion—introversion, thinking—feeling, sensation—intui­
tion. However, since the attitude types arc generally considered to be 
innate rather than developed, our primary interest is in the four function 
types and we can represent the graph two-dimensionally as follows;
Thinking
Sensation---------------------- Intuition
Feeling
If we look at this graph and think of where we might locate the per­
sonalities of various people we know, it should be clear that although 
individuals tend to be more of one type than another, very few persons 
indeed can be considered to be totally limited to one point or even one 
quadrant. This realization was critical in the development of Jung’s theory 
in that it implied that the four quadrants represent types of functioning 
potentially open to all of us. Yet, we typically do not realize this potential 
and the personality tends to adopt one particular quadrant as its “own” 
to the neglect of the others. In this sense, we have a Jungian parallel to 
Freud’s fixation of the mechanisms of defense: the personality becomes 
fixed within certain modes of responding and the potential openness to 
a variety of experiences and possible responses is not realized. For Jung, 
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however, this situation does not call for the abreaction of a repressed 
memory. Rather, he claims that within the personality itself a compensat­
ing function will arise of its own accord. This compensating process is 
called the “transcendent function.”** Let us consider an example of its 
operation.
** See Jung, “The Transcendent Function” (written in 1916; rev. and pub. 1958), 
in Collected Works, vm: 67-91.
For instance, in a person who is overly limited to the thinking-sensation 
quadrant, Jung would claim that a compensating urge toward feeling­
intuition will necessarily emerge and problems arise only to the extent the 
individual resists this compensatory tendency. Just as an individual 
cannot persist in ignoring physiological compensatory signals (warnings 
about needs for sleep, proper nutrition, relaxation), he cannot successfully 
resist these psychological signals either. If he persists in his refusal to see that 
“other side of himself” which yearns for more attention, that unknown 
aspect (the “shadow”) becomes detached from the self, achieving its own 
independent functioning. In mild cases this alter ego may make persistent 
appearances in dreams (as the archetype of the Shadow or perhaps of the 
Anima, the symbol of intuition and feeling). In more severe cases of 
conscious resistance, the compensatory aspect of the personality will 
unexpectantly intrude into everyday activities, i.e., for no patently ex­
plicable reason, the individual may suddenly act “not like himself.” In 
even more severe cases, the counter image will begin to dominate large 
parts of the person’s personality and there is a danger of schizophrenia. 
The Jungian analyst’s task, therefore, is to help the patient to understand 
what is being expressed by these images or archetypes. Although Freud 
considers symbols to be the distorted residues of repressed memories, 
Jung understands them to be warnings about what must be accomplished 
if psychic equilibrium is to be re-established. Freud’s analysis is funda­
mentally retrospective; Jung’s is prospective.
Within this framework, individuation is the continuous responding 
to this compensatory tendency called the “transcendent function.” This 
function is “transcendent” because it urges the person to transcend his 
limited standpoint and to open himself to other ways of perceiving and 
structuring his experience. Consequently, the more the person is able to 
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respond to the transcendent function, the more mobile he becomes among 
the various typological quadrants and the more his psyche becomes 
centered and balanced. No longer a caricature of his full potential to ex­
perience in a variety of ways, the individuated person responds to phe­
nomena as is appropriate in each situation, not blocking out possibilities 
of responding merely because they arc antipodal to his former self-image. 
Bound neither by conceptual thinking nor by sheer feeling, neither by the 
piecework objectivity of sensation nor by the integrative monism of intui­
tion, the ideally individuated person is of no fixed psychological type—he 
changes his mode of functioning to suit the circumstances. Without 
conscious direction, he responds to the balancing forces in his psyche that 
bring him to equilibrium. Although Jung understands individuation to be 
a limiting ideal that can only be very crudely approximated, there is 
much in this conception that has an affinity with the Zen view of the per­
son and we will now consider four of the most significant of these points.
First, there is in this model of individuation, as in Zen, the ambiguity 
between the determinancy and indeterminancy of the person. The less 
the person is charactcrizablc as a fixed psychological type, the more open 
he is to the possibility of experiencing the newness of each situation. 
Within Zen this idea is expressed in terms of there being no objectified 
“self” or “agent.” Both the individuated person and the Zen person is 
determinate only within a given situation, only at a given time: there is no 
abiding self or agent that filters or reconstructs the experience before it is 
made fully conscious. Secondly, the Zen ideal and the individuated man 
are both free from being totally directed by the unconscious forces of 
compulsion. This point is a corollary of the first in that the transcendence 
of a fixed sense of self eliminates the resistance that gives rise to compul­
sive outbreaks (when the person is suddenly “not himself”). Thirdly, 
both the individuated and Zen persons deal with the present in the 
present: there is no Freudian project of recapturing the past in order to 
free new possibilities of responding in the present. Lastly, in both Jung’s 
and Zen’s ideal, the personality functions as a psychic whole without 
conflict between conscious and unconscious or ego and id. In Freud, on 
the other hand, these subdivisions of the personality are always antago­
nistic to each other’s aims.
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Once again, though, we must not let the similarities between Zen 
and Jung on this single point collapse into the position that their projects 
are equivalent. First of all, Jung’s psychoanalytic enterprise is still pri­
marily interpretive. In other words, the analyst’s main duty is to help the 
analysand to interpret the messages from the unconscious as they are com­
municated through archetypal images. Although Jung believes that the 
full interpretation of these images requires imagination and intuition as 
well as scientific objectivity, the Zen Master would still consider them 
counter-productive in that they reify experience. For Zen, to be attached 
to interpretations of archetypes is as dangerous as to be dependent on 
interpretations of words: both are flights from the pre-reflective char­
acter of non-thinking. Second of all, Zen would find Jung’s theory to be 
too self-oriented. The very term “individuation” seems egotistical and it 
appears to refer to the process of self-knowledge that does not recognize 
Dfigen’s admonition that “to know the self is to forget the self.” Stated 
differently, within Jung’s system each person is pursuing “his own” path 
to self-discovery and this assumes a self-consciousness quite foreign to 
Zen. There is no place in Jung’s theory for the emptiness of Zen’s “original 
face,” or “the Person of his original part,” i.e., there is no sense of a return 
to something more basic than the differentiated self. Lastly, in Zen there 
is a strong sense of there being something specific to be “realized”—in 
both senses of the term—something to be recognized and something to 
be accomplished. Each Master’s realization is handed down to his dis­
ciples and a tradition is thereby established, whereas Jung himself offers 
little practical guidance—each person must find his own way. There is 
no “tradition” of individuation and there never can be—for Jung, each 
person’s process is unique.
Now let us generalize the points we have made concerning Zen and 
psychoanalysis.
rv Conclusion: Zen and Psychoanalysis
In Japan I heard a story about a discussion between a Zen Master 
and an American who was formerly a psychotherapist but who had been 
practicing Zen in a monastery for six months. During their conversation, 
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the American noted that he had sensed a continuity between his two ex­
periences in that both Zen and psychotherapy were directed at helping 
people—what we have been calling here the common goal of freeing the 
person to respond more creatively to his present situation. Speaking 
slowly, the Master replied, ‘‘Yes, but Zen and psychotherapy are not 
really the same. In psychotherapy the doctor is still a patient.” Then, 
with a smile beginning to sweep across his face, he added, “Furthermore, 
although psychotherapy might be able to help somewhat, can it help a 
rock? Can it set a pair of shoes in order?”
Using these statements as a point of departure, we can generalize the 
major conclusions reached in the three comparisons discussed in this 
paper.
“In psychotherapy the doctor is still a patient.”
For better or worse, the analyst lacks the authority of the Zen Master. 
Being a psychoanalyst is an occupation; being a Zen Master is a way of 
life. The analysand improves his situation by working through the tech­
niques and interpretations suggested by the analyst, but the Zen disciple 
becomes more aware of himself simply through his direct interaction with 
the Master’s personal authenticity. Fromm makes a similar point:
Accordingly, the [Zen] teacher is not a teacher in the Western 
sense. He is a master, inasmuch as he has mastered his own mind, 
and hence is capable of conveying to the student the only thing 
that can be coveyed: his existence.25
13 Fromm, ZB and Psychoanalysis, p. 120.
The corollary of this idea is that the Master’s authority does not go 
unchallenged. In the sanzen interview the Master as well as the student are 
under pressure to display the “original face.” The authenticity of the 
Master’s state of non-thinking is not merely assumed: it must be manifest. 
Unlike the analyst who seeks a doctor’s objectivity toward his patient’s 
condition (a doctor with a heart condition, for example, may treat a 
patient with a similar condition), the Zen Master teaches solely by 
exemplifying that which the disciple seeks. The Chinese Zen Master 
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Rinzai (Ch: Lin-chi) was known to his followers as the “crouching lion” 
because of the dynamic spontaneity he displayed in sanzen. Through his 
non-thinking responsiveness, he was capable of almost any action: he 
might strike, roar, pounce or sit back and purr. Again, the Zen Master 
is not a person with special knowledge or special techniques; he is a special 
person.
Furthermore, although psychotherapy might be able to help 
people somewhat, can it help a rock? Can it set a pair of shoes in 
order ?
This koan-like comment was perhaps directed specifically to the state 
of mind of the American Zen student and its full implications are un­
doubtedly closed to us. Nevertheless, it will be discussed here insofar as 
it is suggestive of two observations we have already made in this paper:
(1) Zen would maintain that one of the problems in psychoanalysis is 
that the person is often confused with his parts: the conscious/uncon- 
scious, ego/id/superego, conscious psychological type/unconscious shadow, 
etc. For the Zen Master, the person is what is manifested here at this 
very moment. No conceptual mediation or questions about past experi­
ences arc necessary; he responds to the student just-as-he-is. When the 
Master places a rock in a rock garden, he does not characterize the parts 
of the rock nor does he inquire into its past. Given the rock and the 
garden, he intuitively responds to the appropriateness of the situation, 
putting the rock where it “should be.” This ideal applies to the Master’s 
treatment of his disciples. The Zen system of training is based on the 
assumption that if the teacher establishes a responsive, non-thinking 
relationship with his student, there is no need for explicit concern about 
technique or about the problem of transference. To have a previously 
planned strategy of teaching only limits the teacher’s capacity to fully 
respond to the student’s existence as he presents it.
(2) The other point, an extension of the first, is the everyday nature of 
the Zen Master’s non-thinking relationship. Non-thinking is not a mode 
of consciousness reserved for sanzen interviews. In psychoanalysis, as we 
have seen, there is much consideration given to the special relationship 
between analyst and analysand. For the Zen Master, his relationship to 
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his student is only one example of non-thinking. The Master is also in a 
relationship of non-thinking when he drinks tea or sweeps the garden. 
Of course, his response to the student is different from his response to a 
teacup or a broom, but this is because the student manifests himself in a 
different way. The Master merely goes through the day setting shoes in 
order, sweeping leaves in the garden, moving his bowels, helping his 
students. Unaware of his individuation, he feels no need to interpret 
dreams nor to distinguish his conscious from his unconscious. Since non­
thinking is a mode of relating and not a technique nor a special under­
standing, it continues throughout the day in whatever the Master does. 
It is in this respect that the Zen Buddhist view of the person goes beyond 
the more restricted psychoanalytic categories of Freud and Jung.
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